

**PEOPLE'S UNION
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**UAPA:
CRIMINALISING
DISSENT AND
STATE TERROR**

**STUDY OF UAPA ABUSE
IN INDIA, 2009 - 2022**

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MADHURA SB & OTHERS**

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Study of UAPA Abuse in India, 2009 - 2022

By

PUCL

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Campaign for Deepening Democracy

To check out Campaign name and title before finalising:

Alternative title: Persecution by Prosecution, Chosen Weapon of the State (or any other suggestions?)

Alternative Campaign name: #RepealUAPA Campaign

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Indian state has a vast arsenal of anti-terror, criminal laws in its armoury with which it can quell, contain and counter any activity it deems to be ‘terrorist’ acts which threatens the unity, integrity, security (including economic security), or sovereignty of India. From the colonial era provisions like Sec. 121-A (waging war against India) and Sec. 124-A (Sedition) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), it has armed itself with more specialised laws like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 (AFSPA), the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 (UAPA)¹ and the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA).

These laws gave the state wide, unbridled and unregulated powers of arrest and incarceration without charge for long periods and denial of procedural rights like bail among others. They also legitimized the departures from ordinary criminal law including changing essential rules of evidence like the principle of adverse inference or presumption of guilt or revealing identity of witnesses and other checks and balances, evolved through many decades of development of ordinary criminal law.

Apart from the central laws, many individual states have passed their own security laws which give it even more stringent powers like the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 and the Chhattisgarh Special Public Safety Act, 2005. Another set of laws were passed ostensibly to control organised crime like the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crimes Act, 1999 (MCOCA) which soon saw various clones in different states like the Karnataka Control of Organised Crimes Act and the Gujarat Control of Organised Crimes Act, 2003 (GUJCOCA)². The common dimension in all these laws was the wide powers it gave the state police accompanied by loose definitions of offences and draconian procedural provisions.

¹ Which replaced the previous ‘Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987’ (called TADA) and the ‘Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act, 2002’ (called POTA).

² The GUJCOCA law of 2003 was passed when Narendra Modi was the CM of Gujarat and contained several harsh provisions including one of the most controversial provisions making confessions of accused to police officers as admissible, contrary to the rule in ordinary criminal law. So much so, President Abdul Kalam returned the Bill in 2008 for reconsideration; the Bill was re - presented before the next President, but without making the changes suggested by former President Kalam. The second time too President Pratibha Patil returned the proposed Bill. It was sent for Presidential assent a third time without major corrections to President Pranab Mukherjee who also returned the same Bill in 2015.

Finally, the Bill with the same provisions which former three Presidents refused to approve and had suggested changes, was re-presented before President Ramnath Kovind who gave assent to the Gujarat law on 07th November, 2019, 16 years after the original bill was passed by the Gujarat Assembly. By this time, former CM, Narendra Modi had become the Prime Minister of India.

2. CONTEXT

2.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANTI-TERROR LAWS

The primary anti-terror law in India, today, is the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). However, when it was passed in 1967, it was originally conceived to be a law meant to quell “unlawful activities”. It owes its origins to the Anti-Hindi agitations in Tamil Nadu and the demand for a separate nation state of Tamil Nadu which was at its peak in the 1960’s. The law itself came to be seldom used.

With the rise of the Khalistani movement in Punjab and the emergence of increasing resort to terror incidents of bombs placed in crowded public spaces, the central government passed first the Terrorist Affected Areas Act (TAAA) which gave way to the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, (TADA), 1987. Owing to widespread criticism and campaigns demanding repeal, the TADA law was not renewed in 1997 after its lapse. The central government then passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2002, which came to be repealed in 2004.

However, the Congress-led UPA government which came to power in 2004 with the promise to repeal POTA, amended the already existing UAPA to cover “terrorist activities” and included some of the most draconian provisions of POTA and TADA. Thus, the UAPA, a law meant to originally tackle unlawful activities, was thereafter transformed to an anti-terror law.

UAPA was substantially revised in 2008 in the wake of the terrorist attack in Mumbai in November, 2008. Apart from changes to UAPA making it very stringent, a new law was passed, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act, 2008 by which a separate cadre of the police force was carved out to tackle terrorist crimes. The NIA had sweeping and wide powers and was directly under the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) of the Government of India.

2.2 WHAT MAKES THESE LAWS DRACONIAN AND UNDEMOCRATIC?

The problematic issue about anti-terror laws is the very loose definition of ‘terrorist act’ which was defined to be an act intended to disrupt law and order, public order or endanger the unity, integrity and security of the State or to spread terror in the minds of sections of people. These laws are said to be directed to deal with terrorism and organised crimes such as contract killing, ponzi schemes, the narcotics trade, extortion rackets, cybercrime, land-grabbing and human trafficking. However, in reality, by giving sweeping powers to the police, they have been used to criminalise political dissenters and those questioning state policy.

Common to both the central laws as also the state laws – is the **total absence of any provision** making the police officers in charge, legally accountable for abusing the law and responsible for violating the valuable constitutional rights of persons arrested by them. The failure in Indian law to recognise the principle of “*Command Responsibility*”;³ has only emboldened the police across the country to wilfully misuse and abuse their powers to prosecute and imprison people. Constitutionally recognised acts of dissent and democratic, peaceful protests have thus become criminalised and crushed using the might of the police and state power.

At the heart of the abuse is a fundamental flaw in the criminal justice system. This was very eloquently explained by noted human rights lawyer KG Kannabiran, who pointed out that while “**the law defines the offence, (It is) the state which defines the offender**”.

Under the constitutional scheme, the “State” which is the elected political executive, exercises security power through the police. Though the police is administratively under the control of the executive, it is constitutionally envisaged to function as an independent professional force whose commitment is to enforce and respect the Constitution of India and not to be loyalists of the ruling party. However, the common experience has been of the ‘state’ using the law to silence opponents and critics of the ruling establishment and the police largely playing the role of active collaborators.

The history of the so-called anti-terror laws in India is the story of an unmitigated tragedy. Thousands of ordinary people are arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned for long years. They suffer long trials without pre-trial bail and are also denied many safeguards which are otherwise available under ordinary criminal laws.

We embarked on this study of the abuse of UAPA in view of the rampant abuse of the law, especially after the present NDA Government came to power in May, 2014, and weaponised UAPA to “Persecute by prosecution”.

It is sufficient for the purposes of this study to notice the following differences in the provisions of UAPA.

1. There is a major difference between the legal provision of “unlawful activity” (Sec.2(o) UAPA) and “terrorist act” (Sec.2(k) read with Sec.15, UAPA). ‘Unlawful activity’ can be broadly defined as any act which is intended to or supports a claim for secession or causes disaffection against India. In contrast, ‘terrorist activity’ is any act done with intention to threaten or likely to threaten unity, integrity, security (including economic security) or sovereignty of India or with intention to strike terror in the people by using explosives, arms and other substances.
2. One of the most stringent and draconian provisions of UAPA is regarding obtaining bail, as provided in Sec. 43D(5) of UAPA. In December 2008, major amendments

³ Command Responsibility refers to the entire chain of command in the police hierarchy responsible for investigating a case, from the senior most to the lowest level officers.

were introduced to Sec. 43D(5) of UAPA, making bail virtually impossible to obtain for terrorist offences. The amended provision denies bail if the court has reasonable grounds to believe a mere accusation against the accused as prima facie true. This provision applies only for offences defined as “terrorist Offences” (in Chapter IV and VI of the UAPA Act) and not for ‘unlawful activities’.⁴

3. Sec. 18 of UAPA provides for punishment for conspiracy and states that “whoever conspires or attempts to commit or advocates, abets, advises or incites, directs or knowingly facilitates the commission of a terrorist act”. The term ‘conspiracy’ itself is not defined in the UAPA, and the definition of conspiracy as provided in Sec. 120A/120B IPC will have to be read as part of UAPA. To put it simply, the UAPA makes the distinction between a “terrorist activity” which uses explosives, fire arms causing death, injuries or damages to people and property, as also the “conspiracy to commit a terrorist act” punished without any incident itself having taken place.
4. This is a crucial distinction, for the experience of TADA and POTA⁵ show that most often, people in the thousands, have been prosecuted not for actually having committed a terrorist offence causing death or injury but on the allegation of CONSPIRING to commit a terrorist act with no further actual action of a terrorist act. This could occur because the law provided for such a vague and loosely defined offence which can be used to implicate anyone with the mere charge of conspiring to commit any of the terrorist offences enumerated in TADA or POTA or now, in UAPA.

2.3 WHAT IS THE STUDY ABOUT?

Despite wide ranging complaints about the abuse of UAPA, reliable, comprehensive data about prosecutions, year-wise is not readily available. Considering the draconian provisions of anti-terror laws, from TADA to POTA and now UAPA, it is a valid assumption that the government itself would provide year-wise, state-wise information on all UAPA cases:

- that were registered,
- pending investigation,

⁴ The Supreme Court in the case of ‘NIA vs Watali’ (2019) interpreted Sec.43D(5) to say the trial court cannot analyse the nature of accusation or evidence in the case for considering bail and all that it needs to examine is if the prosecution (police) have submitted documents reporting the accused person’s involvement. The ridiculousness of this proposition lies in the fact that the police will in any case always submit a report about involvement of any person in the case for the purpose of getting remand. This is sufficient to deny bail. For longish discussion, see V. Suresh, (2021), ‘UAPA – Law as an instrumentality of State Tyranny and Violence’, In Darshana Mitra and Santanu Chakraborty, ‘Sudha Bharadwaj Speaks: A Life In Law & Activism’, (pp 43 - 82), People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL).

⁵ As of May 2005, investigations were pending in 216 POTA cases involving 2,492 accused persons, of whom 566 individuals had been arrested and 341 had been released on bail. The POTA Repeal Act permitted the central government to constitute more than one review committee to complete this review process. See Anil, K., Gerald, C., Amata, K., Sam, M., & Jed, R. (2006). Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism, and Security Laws in India. *Columbia Journal of Asian Law*, 20(1), 93-234.

- charge-sheeted, and pending trial, and;
- cases that have concluded, including details of arrest, bail, duration of trials, conviction and acquittal rates and so on.

Sadly, such data is not available in the public domain. The annual reports of the National Crimes Record Bureau (NCRB) give only bare data without details of stages in the prosecution. To fill this vital gap, this study has been undertaken with the idea of creating a comprehensive database of all UAPA prosecutions in India. The aim is to provide a one-stop database which will include all case documents from over the years, from the time of registering FIRs, till the conclusion of trials. In the absence of such a database today, this initiative will seek to collect data from trial court lawyers as also collate information available in District Courts portal, websites of state police, NIA website, websites of the High Courts and Supreme Court and law portals.

To start with, this particular report is confined to the study of information available in NIA website, the NCRB Annual Reports called 'Crime In India' and Replies given to Parliamentary Questions raised in Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.

➤ **A Caveat**

(i) On NIA Website

It is necessary to point out that this report is based on information available in the NIA website as of 12 August, 2022 (<https://nia.gov.in/nia-cases.htm>). The NIA website has a list of all the cases handled by the NIA across its 12 regional offices ⁶, with information on FIRs, police final reports, trial court judgments and other case related documents.

The information is neither uniform nor comprehensive. For example, even when a specific case records that the Police Final Reports (charge sheets) have already been filed, the actual Police Final Reports are not always provided. Similarly, in all cases where trials are shown to be completed, trial court judgments are not always. We are therefore constrained for the purposes of this Study to rely only on available information in the NIA website.

(ii) On NCRB Reports

In a similar vein, it is important to point out a methodological flaw in the computation of NCRB data on UAPA. This refers to the '*Principal Offence Rule*' followed by NCRB to calculate the incidence of different types of crimes. Under this method, every FIR, irrespective of the number of offences charged in it, gets classified only under one offence - called the principal offence - which is determined by the maximum sentence that can be imposed under any of the offences charged in the FIR. Therefore, if a crime is of rape and murder, the FIR and the case will get classified only under the crime head of murder, and not rape, as murder has a greater punishment term than rape.

⁶ NIA website mentions 12 branch offices, but all the cases uploaded are only from 9 of these branches apart from Delhi. (Cases are not uploaded under Chennai, Imphal and Chandigarh branches).

For special laws like UAPA, this leads to gross undercounting. In most cases where UAPA charges are included, other crimes with greater punishment such as murder, or offences against the state, are also alleged in the FIR. Thus, these cases seldom get categorised under the head of UAPA, thereby distorting the data on UAPA cases. We are pointing out to this methodological limitation more to caution the reader that the actual situation may perhaps be grimmer than the analysis highlighted through this study.

3. PART A – THE NIA ANALYSIS

The NIA was constituted by the NIA Act, 2008 for the investigation and prosecution of offences affecting the security, sovereignty and integrity of the nation. The NIA Act introduced a list of “Scheduled Offences” and stipulated that the NIA alone had power to investigate those offences. UAPA offences, anti-state / sedition offence, offences under Arms Act etc., were included in the Schedule.

The following analysis is based on information provided in the NIA website (<https://www.nia.gov.in/nia-cases.htm>), as of 12th August 2022. The site provides the following 4 types of information:

- a) Summary Details and Press Release Statements of cases
- b) FIRs by which the case was taken up for investigation by the NIA, either Suo motu or if it was referred to it by the Ministry of Home Affairs vide section 4 and 6 of the NIA Act, 2008.
- c) Police Final Reports u/s 173(8) Criminal Procedure Code, popularly called Charge-sheets, where the investigation is completed and the prosecution has filed the Final Report before the UAPA / NIA Court.⁷
- d) Judgments at the end of trials in a number of cases have also been provided.


3.1 NIA CASES INVOLVING UAPA CHARGES

As of 12th August, 2022, the NIA website lists a total of 456 cases handled by the NIA.

Of these 456 cases, about 78% of them, ie. 357 cases involve UAPA charges amongst other offences and the remaining 22% of the NIA cases do not involve UAPA charges in them.

The geographic distribution of the 357 UAPA cases is shown in the following map, highlighting the top States/UTs that have a high number of UAPA cases registered by the NIA. It should be pointed out that the Head Office of the NIA in Delhi has the maximum number of cases as the jurisdiction of the Delhi office covers cases of alleged terrorist activities spanning multiple states in India.

⁷ ‘Supplementary charge-sheets’ are filed as and when accused are said to be absconding or apprehended, thereby, prolonging trials. A classic example is that of the Bhima Koregaon case, where 3 Final Reports or Charge-sheets were filed after several accused persons were arrested, with Fr. Stan Swamy being the 16th and last person arrested.




➤ **NIA – UAPA cases registered during UPA period and NDA period**

The NIA prosecutions were examined in terms of the number of cases filed during the period when Manmohan Singh – led UPA regime was in power (2009-May, 2014) and the Narendra Modi – led era (May, 2014 - continuing).

The average number of UAPA cases registered per year by the NIA during the UPA regime (2009 – May, 2014) is 13. In contrast, during the Modi-led NDA regime (May 2014 – continuing) the average number of cases registered per year is 34.

This contrast in figures clearly show that during the Modi era, there is an increasing tendency to use UAPA as the chosen legal weapon. This is shown in the graph below.



➤ **NIA – Suo moto versus State transferred cases**

There are two ways by which the NIA investigates any criminal case involving the commission of any of the ‘Scheduled Offences’, namely:

- (a) The Central Government under Sec. 6(5) of the NIA Act, 2008 directs NIA to *Suo motu* register and investigate a case in any state, if the incidents involved multi-state ramifications or the central government felt it should be handled by the NIA
- (b) The Central Government (Ministry of Home Affairs) directs NIA to take over cases handled by the state police/agencies where the crime was originally registered and investigated

The point to be noted is that the power of the Central Government is total and absolute in determining whether any investigation should be taken over by NIA irrespective of whether the State Government consents to it or not. There is no provision in the NIA Act for consultation with the State Government for it to approve or refuse the transfer⁸. Parliamentary debates at the time of passage of the NIA Act, show that there was widespread criticism over this provision giving unlimited power to the Central Government and the NIA to ‘take over’ any criminal investigation.

It is using this power that the Central Government abruptly and suddenly transferred the Bhima Koregaon case from the Maharashtra police to the NIA in early 2020, very shortly after the change of government in Maharashtra from the BJP led government by Devendra Phadnavis as the Chief Minister to the Maharashtra Vikas Aghadi (MVA) led government headed by Uddhav Thackeray of the Shiv Sena. There are a number of other cases which have been transferred from the State police to the NIA that have received criticism as for example the Munchingput case in Andhra Pradesh.

A further analysis of the NIA website database show that out of all the UAPA cases handled by NIA, 41 cases or 12% were registered Suo motu by the NIA whereas 316 cases representing 88% of cases were transferred from state investigating agencies to the NIA. It is a moot question as to whether the state governments were consulted or they agreed to these transfers. The validity of these transfers from the state police to the NIA is also suspect since a high number of these transferred cases were not even remotely connected to national security or threat to sovereignty or involved any violence. A 2021 NIA case from Tamil Nadu is an illustration of this. In this case, a man was arrested in Madurai, Tamil Nadu under Sec. 13 of UAPA for a Facebook post on 15th August, 2019 where he had remarked whether India had really got independence to celebrate 15th August as Independence Day. The case originally filed by the Tallakulam police in Madurai was abruptly transferred to the NIA by the Central Government in 2021.⁹

⁸ This is however not the case for CBI. Sec. 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 provides for mandatory consent of the State Government before the CBI can take over the case, unlike the NIA investigations under NIA Act.


⁹ RC 07/2021/NIA/DLI, <https://nia.gov.in/case-detail.htm?380>

3.2 MOST COMMONLY CHARGED UAPA OFFENCES

As discussed previously there are two distinctive components to the UAPA law, each with very different implications in terms of prisoners’ rights, bail provisions and human rights implications:

- (i) **Unlawful Activities:** Offences charged under the classification of “unlawful activities” covering offences under Sec. 10 (penalty for being a member of **unlawful association**), Sec. 11 (penalty for dealing with **funds of an unlawful association**) and Sec. 13 (punishment for **unlawful activities**). The stringent provisions for granting bail u/s 43D(5) do not apply to these offences, which means, getting bail is not so difficult as compared to “terrorist activities” i.e. anti-terror offences.
- (ii) **Terrorist Activities:** Offences which are classified as anti-terror provisions which includes Sec. 15 and 16 (Punishment **for terrorist act**), Sec. 17 (Punishment **for raising funds** for terrorist activity), Sec. 18 (punishment **for conspiracy**), Sec. 18A (punishment **for organising terrorist camps**), Sec. 18B (punishment **for recruiting any person** for terrorist act), Sec. 19 (**harbouring**), Sec. 20 (**being member of terrorist gang or organisation**) and some other offences.

The following chart shows the most commonly invoked UAPA offences and the number of times they have been invoked in all the 357 UAPA cases handled by NIA.



3.3 SEC. 18 OF UAPA – AN ANALYSIS

Considering that Sec. 18 (Punishment for Conspiracy) is the offence most invoked among all UAPA sections, a separate analysis of Sec. 18 charges was undertaken as part of this study to understand if there is any underlying pattern in its use.

Sec. 18 of UAPA provides that:

“Whoever conspires or attempts to commit or advocates, abets, advises or incites, directs or knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act shall be punishable with imprisonment which is not less than 5 years which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”

Since specific commission of terrorist acts are covered in Sec. 15 and 16, it is clear that the scope of Sec. 18 covers the terrain of actions which are preparatory to or by way of incitement, abetment and conspiracy to commit a terrorist act. In other words, where the accused persons are allegedly involved in the “conspiracy” to commit a terrorist act as distinct from actually committing it.

It should be pointed out that the offence of conspiracy as defined in Sec. 120A/B IPC is very wide, elastic and so constructed that it can cover any action within its wide scope. The offence of conspiracy is complete just with the “agreement” to commit the conspiracy and the “object” of the agreement itself need not have occurred. Such over broad, sweeping and loosely worded provisions obviously permits arbitrary use of its provision to rope in anyone the police wants to implicate in any case. In fact, it is corresponding provisions of “conspiracy” in TADA and POTA which were widely abused to arrest and implicate thousands of people who spent many years in jail. The dire situation eventually led to the Supreme Court formulating in *Shaheen Welfare Association* case (1996)¹⁰ a four-fold classification of TADA undertrial prisoners. This was based on the specific role allegedly played by each individual person in the crime alleged against them, so that only those classified to be ‘hard core’ alone were to be kept in jail as undertrials and others could be released on bail.

Just as this graded criterion to classify undertrial prisoners was evolved in the Shaheen Welfare Association case, an appropriate criterion should be evolved to classify undertrial prisoners in existing UAPA cases, and to recommend consideration of their cases for grant of bail based on the criteria drawn up. This will help to reduce the severity of the incarceration and reduce the onerous load placed on individuals who have been unnecessarily implicated under UAPA charges.

¹⁰ Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union Of India & Ors, (1996), SCC (2) 616, JT 1996 (2) 719, available at <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1208997/>

➤ **An Explanatory Note to the Method of Analysis of Sec. 18 Cases: Segregation of “Incidents” versus “No incidents” Cases**

The idea underlying the analysis of UAPA cases in which Sec. 18 was invoked or charged is to segregate the cases in which actual incidents of terrorist acts had been committed from those cases where no such terrorist acts were committed but people were roped in on the charge of conspiracy to commit the terrorist offence. Analysis of the data so collected and segregated would help expose if Sec. 18 was used deliberately only for the purpose of implicating persons under UAPA to ensure that they did not get bail easily.

For the purposes of this study the following definition was used for categorizing a case as one under “Incident” having taken place as contrasted to cases when “No incident” had occurred.

- Incident having taken place = “Any incident of actual violence inflicting physical injury or property damage (both private and public) with the use of arms, explosives or other weapons”.
- In contrast, the category of “No incident” included cases in which there were no specific allegations of commission of terrorist act, but other charges, including allegation of terror funding, membership of proscribed terrorist organisation, recovery of explosives, arms, money, drugs and foreign currency were present.

Using the method outlined above, of the 357 UAPA cases prosecuted by the NIA, the total number of cases in which Sec. 18 had been invoked were found to be 238 cases. These 238 cases were thereafter segregated into cases in which some specific terrorist incident had allegedly taken place and those in which the FIR / Charge-sheet did not indicate any specific terrorist activity or incident having occurred.

SECTION 18 UAPA

- Section 18 deals with 'punishment for conspiracy, etc'.
- A mere 'agreement' to commit offence is sufficient to be prosecuted. For being prosecuted under this offence, a terror incident involving violence need not have occurred.

Category	Number of Cases	Percentage
Incident Happened	86	36%
No Incident Happened	152	64%

Of 238 cases involving section 18 charge, no incident has taken place in 64% of the cases (152 cases).

Most of the persons arrested under Sec 18 charge continue to remain in jail without bail

The 238 cases were grouped into two:

Group A: Cases where Sec. 18 charges were invoked in which some incident of terrorism like bursting bombs, killings, attacks and so on took place; and

Group B: Cases where Sec. 18 charges were invoked in which no specific incident involving weapons or causing physical injury or harm was reported.

The following table shows the nature of allegations in the cases under these two groups involving Sec. 18 charge.

Table 1: Nature of Allegations in Sec. 18 UAPA cases

GROUP A: Incident Occurred	GROUP B: No Actual Incident Reported
Bomb blast, IED Explosions	Member of proscribed terrorist organisation
Killings, Murder	Fake Indian Currency Note (FICN)
Attack, Ambush, Shooting	Recovery of explosives, arms, money, drugs
Destroying public property	Conspiracy charges simpliciter
-	Terror Funding
-	Illegal border crossing, Espionage
TOTAL - 86 cases out of 238 (36%)	TOTAL - 152 cases out of 238 (64%)

What is significant is that 152/238 cases (or 64%) cases involving Sec. 18 charge are in respect of cases where there is no allegation of a terrorist act or an actual incident of terror having taken place. In other words, the mere allegation of the police that a person is a member of a proscribed terrorist organisation or some recoveries were made from him of a weapon or explosives or drugs or money is sufficient to get the person arrested and imprisoned for many years.

➤ **Danger due to Ambiguity in Sec. 18: Prevalence of Abuse by police**

At its core, the UAPA is a political legal weapon at the hands of the state to use at will against those who the state deems as posing a ‘danger to security – national, economic or otherwise’. Invariably, those against whom the UAPA has been widely used belong to members of the Muslim minority community, political dissenters and activists, those dubbed to be members of extremist groups and so on. The problem lies in the fact that a mere allegation that a person belongs to a ‘banned or proscribed’ organisation without any supportive evidence, is

sufficient to get the person implicated and arrested. Even if eventually such persons are acquitted for want of proof, they end up being imprisoned for many years.

The dangers implicit in a vaguely worded, overbroad definition of “conspiracy to commit terrorist acts” as found in Sec. 18, is highlighted by the following two case studies.

**(i) Membership to Banned Organisation- Case of Assam, 2010
(RC-10-2010-DLI)**

19 persons from Assam were arrested under Sec. 120B, 121, 121A IPC and Sec. 16, 17, 18, 18A, 18B and 20 of UAPA for their alleged membership to the proscribed terrorist organisation United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and for allegedly entering into a conspiracy to wage war against India by raising and transferring funds for activities of UNLF. For this purpose, they have allegedly collected arms and ammunitions and raised funds by extortion in Manipur and brought to Guwahati. 18 accused were convicted under the above UAPA charges by the Special Court, Guwahati in this case.

What is to be pointed out here is that even though there was no actual incidence of terror that took place following the alleged conspiracy, or any physical injury/violence arising out of the alleged conspiracy, the accused have been convicted for the above charges, including Sec.18, punishment for conspiracy and Sec.20, punishment for being member of terrorist organisation and sentenced to 10 years Rigorous Imprisonment (RI).

**(ii) Fake Indian Currency Note – Case of West Bengal, 2012
(RC-01-2012-HYD)**

25 persons were arrested under Sec. 489B, 489C r/w 120B IPC and Sec. 16 and 18 of UAPA for allegedly circulating Counterfeit Indian Currency Notes as a part of larger conspiracy to destabilize the monetary system of India. Further, they were allegedly raising funds for terrorist activities by way of exchanging genuine currency notes against the counterfeit currency notes circulated by them. FICN of more than 31 lakhs face value has been seized, after being printed in Pakistan and smuggled into India through Bangladesh via Malda District, West Bengal. All 25 accused persons were acquitted of the UAPA charges after 3 years from their date of arrest, though some (16) of them were convicted under Sec. 489B, 489C alone.

Here, it is important to note that the accused persons were arrested and imprisoned inter alia for alleged commission of ‘terrorist act’ (Sec.16) and ‘conspiracy’ (Sec.18), only to be acquitted of these UAPA charges after years for want of proof, as there was no ‘terrorist’ incident that had taken place.

➤ **Conclusion of Sec. 18 Analysis**

The idea behind a detailed analysis of cases that have Section 18- ‘Punishment for conspiracy etc.’ charge, was to understand the nature of cases that fall under conspiracy charges

and juxtapose it with the question of whether there was any actual incidence of terror or violence that occurred connected to the allegation of a conspiracy. The sub-classification of the 238 cases that have Section 18 charges, into categories based on whether an actual incidence of violence or a physical injury to life/property had taken place or not highlighted serious problems with the way the 'conspiracy' provision was applied in practice, across the country.

The inherent ambiguity and overbroad definition of a terrorist offence as found in Sec. 18 UAPA (as also in Sec. 15 & 16), permits the police wide powers to rope in anyone using the net of conspiracy. All it requires is an allegation of the conspiracy to commit a terrorist act without any concrete action itself having occurred. Thus, the abuse of UAPA is symptomatic of the problems arising out of having such blurred and nebulous lines of defining something as serious as terror activity and the attendant law criminalizing it.

4. PART B – THE NCRB STORY

A more comprehensive picture of the nature and volume of UAPA cases across India emerges when we study the annual Reports of the National Crimes Records Bureau (NCRB) called ‘Crime In India’. The figures for UAPA cases are separately provided from the year 2015 onwards till 2020, all of which are available in public domain. (<https://ncrb.gov.in/en/crime-india>)

The NCRB figures are also the basis for answers provided by the Ministry of Home Affairs to questions raised in the Parliament, both in Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. The official Replies with Questions used in this study have been added as part of the Annexures. Two aspects about the NCRB data should be kept in mind before proceeding to the analysis:

1. The NCRB figures provide a wider database of UAPA cases throughout India than the NIA website database, as the latter covers only cases handled by the NIA, and not cases investigated by state agencies,¹¹ and it is further limited by the inconsistency and lack of uniformity in the availability of documents and information within the NIA website.
2. As remarked earlier as a caveat, the NCRB data is subject to the methodological limitation of the ‘Principal Offence Rule’ that results in gross underreporting of UAPA cases.

4.1 STATE-WISE REGISTRATION OF UAPA CASES, 2015 – 2020

There was a total of **5924** UAPA cases registered and **8371** persons arrested under UAPA charges between 2015 – 2020 across India. The following table highlights this:


¹¹ The available data in both the NCRB and NIA databases, do not shed light on: whether the NCRB data includes the cases listed in the NIA website database ie., whether the NIA database is separate from the NCRB database whether the cases originally investigated by the state agencies but later taken over by the NIA are still included in the NCRB database.

Table 2: UAPA Cases (2015-2020)

Year	UAPA Cases Registered	Persons Arrested under UAPA
2015	897	1128
2016	922	999
2017	901	1554
2018	1182	1421
2019	1226	1948
2020	796	1321
TOTAL (2015 – 2020)	5924	8371

Source: Reply to Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2486 dated 09.03.2021 and NCRB CII Report 2020

From the state-wise data on UAPA cases registered annually between 2015 – 2020, the following graph highlights the states that have shown a consistent trend in registering high number of cases under UAPA:



While Manipur, Assam, Jammu & Kashmir and Jharkhand have shown a consistent high registration of UAPA cases, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu¹² record a sporadic registration of cases in significant numbers.

Note: The accuracy of the NCRB figures have been doubted by many trial court lawyers and activists from states like Chhattisgarh and Karnataka who point out to a large number of cases in their states in which scores of local persons have been arrested and detained in prison over long periods of time, but which is not finding reflection in the NCRB statistics. These issues will be examined in greater detail once information is gathered from each state as regards pendency of UAPA prosecutions in their respective special courts.

4.2 AT THE HEART OF ABUSE OF UAPA: BAIL AND CONVICTION RATE

The problem with considering the NCRB figures of number of persons acquitted or convicted is that they probably refer to UAPA cases registered in previous years and not to cases filed in the respective years alone; this is because acquittals and convictions arise only at the end of the criminal trial before the special court. As a rule, UAPA trials, at a minimum, take anywhere from 3 to 5 years to conclude.¹³ Hence unless the figures of persons acquitted or convicted can be correlated to the cases they were concerned with, the NCRB data provided by the MHA to the Lok Sabha, by itself has not much significance.

In reply to questions raised in the Lok Sabha, the Ministry of Home Affairs in its reply dated 14.12.2021 reported the following:

Table 3: Persons on Bail under UAPA

Year	Persons Arrested	Persons On Bail	% On Bail
2018	1421	232	16.32
2019	1948	625	32.08
2020	1321	223	16.88
Total	4690	1080	-

Source: Reply to Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2531, 14.12.2021

¹² The NCRB figures show a sudden spurt of 270 cases being registered in 2019 in Tamil Nadu, in which 308 persons were arrested. Furthermore, the reply to Parliamentary question (Lok Sabha question dated 14.12.2021), reported that all the 308 arrested persons in 2019 in TN, were released on bail in the same year.

¹³ This too is a conservative minimum period; UAPA trials have been known to conclude even 10 - 15 years after the incidents and the first arrests.

In *Table 3*, the assumption is that the number of persons reported to be “on bail” in any specific year correlates to the persons arrested in that specific year. The figure so calculated itself is very low and supports the impression that once arrested in a UAPA case it takes many years for the accused persons to obtain bail, if at all they get bail in the first place.

It is crucial that the Government of India comes out with accurate and segregated information about number of UAPA cases registered year-wise and state-wise. Correlated with the year-wise provision of UAPA cases, the following information also needs to be provided:

- numbers of persons arrested (in each year),
- numbers of persons released on bail and time taken to have obtained bail
- numbers of persons who have still not obtained bail
- average length of trials to conclude.

4.3 THE TRAGEDY OF CONVICTION RATES IN UAPA CASES

While discussing the issue of conviction rates it is important to point out to two methods of calculating conviction rate:

- (i) Conviction rate calculated based on the number of cases; and
- (ii) Conviction rate calculated based on the number of persons arrested

Following the standard premise used by NCRB in *Table 4* that the number of cases where trial is completed and cases which resulted in conviction relates to the same year, the calculation of the conviction rate based on the number of persons arrested and shown to be convicted in *Table 5* also relates to each year. Since the NCRB reports provide the number of persons arrested and convicted year-wise, the conviction rates are calculated as shown below.

Table 4: Conviction Rate (Calculated Based on the Number of Cases)						
Year	UAPA			IPC (Cognizable Crimes)		
	Cases convicted (A)	Cases where Trial is completed (B)	Conviction Rate [(A/B)*100]	Cases convicted (C)	Cases where Trial is completed (D)	Conviction Rate [(C/D)*100]
2015	11	76	14.5	621320	1325989	46.9
2016	11	33	33.3	596078	1274348	46.8
2017	34	69	49.3	649852	1331222	48.8
2018	34	125	27.2	638955	1277011	50
2019	33	113	29.2	620809	1232507	50.4
2020	27	128	21.1	453890	766962	59.2
Total	112	340	32.9	3580904	7208039	48.9
Conviction Rate from 2015-2020	27.57			49.67		

Source: NCRB - Crime in India: 2015 to 2020, Chapter 18A, Tables 18A.3, 18A.1

Table 5: Conviction Rate (Calculated Based on the Persons Arrested)

Year	UAPA			IPC (Cognizable Crimes)		
	Persons Convicted (A)	Persons Arrested (B)	Conviction Rate [(A/B)*100]	Persons Convicted (C)	Persons Arrested (D)	Conviction Rate [(C/D)*100]
2015	23	1128	2.03	869013	3636596	23.89
2016	24	999	2.40	794616	3737870	21.25
2017	39	1554	2.50	873983	3727909	23.44
2018	35	1421	2.46	864686	3315033	26.08
2019	34	1948	1.74	837075	3112639	26.89
2020	80	1321	6.05	634229	4424852	14.33
Total	235	8371	2.80	4873602	21954899	22.19
Conviction Rate from 2015-2020	2.80			22.19		

Source: NCRB - Crime in India: 2015 to 2020, Chapter 19A, Tables 19A.7, 19A.5

One of the key indicators of the extent of abuse by the Indian state is the low conviction rate in UAPA cases. The conviction rate of UAPA cases based on number of cases is 27.5%, according to NCRB's calculation method. While the former figure by itself is considerably low, the real implication of poor conviction rate becomes evident when the conviction rate is calculated based on the number of persons arrested.

Thus, when calculated based on the number of persons arrested and convicted, the conviction rate of UAPA cases is an abysmal **2.8%**, following the trend of its preceding anti-terrorism laws such as TADA and POTA that were repealed.

What this means is that close to 97.2 % of 8,371 persons arrested from 2015 to 2020, (ie. **8,136 persons**) **actually get acquitted at the end of trials** in the UAPA courts. Such high acquittal rates, only highlights the fact that most of the prosecutions are devoid of merit and did not warrant initiation of any prosecution in the first place, much less under the UAPA.

Another practice which is pointed out by many trial lawyers across the country which boosts up the conviction rate, is the practice of 'plea bargaining', offered to persons accused of less severe UAPA offences carrying lower terms of imprisonment, if they plead guilty.¹⁴ For

¹⁴ Plea bargaining - Accused persons who have not obtained bail and have spent many years in jail, are offered the opportunity to plead guilty of the lesser offences; and in return, they will be convicted for the lower offences and court will impose imprisonment sentence in such a way that it will cover the period of their incarceration already undergone. In other words, the sentence imposed on them will be for such a period that it will cover the period of imprisonment already undergone by them.

many prisoners who have already suffered personally and financially from long years of imprisonment and being dubbed a 'terrorist', plea bargaining is acceptable way of cutting their losses as it promises to free them from custody; while for the prosecution it boosts up the conviction rate.

This practice, which is not legal, raises very disturbing questions about the actual way the 'Criminal Justice System' functions in anti-terror cases. However, a lot more study is required to establish how prevalent and widespread this practice is before we offer any suggestions of how to tackle this practice.

The indisputable fact today, remains those thousands of persons arrested under UAPA are languishing in jail without bail, before eventually getting acquitted. The legal, moral and democratic question before us is whether such a law as the UAPA be permitted to exist in our law books. An equally important question that has to be addressed is about the accountability of police officials who wilfully bend and break the law and the need to prosecute them for abuse of the law.

5. ORDEALS OF STATE ABUSE: TERROR, TRAGEDY AND TRAUMA

The big numbers behind the study do little to uncover the scale of the human tragedy resulting from the abuse of UAPA. A close look at the lives of the victims of state abuse - Muslim minority, Dalit-Bahujan-Adivasis, activists, journalists, academicians and students - reveals the immensity of the human, emotional, financial suffering experienced not just by those falsely implicated but also by their families.

Those arrested languish in jail sometimes even for decades, waiting for their trial to begin. By the time they are acquitted, the damage is complete; the irreparable damage done to various aspects of their lives and also to those integral to them. The following collage is an attempt to bring to light the human stories behind the tyranny unleashed by the state which uses UAPA as its chosen weapon for abuse.

AKHIL GOGOI & 3 OTHERS (ASSAM)

- Arrested for alleged incitement of violence in the Anti-CAA protest in Assam
- 1 year & 7 months in Jail (Dec 2019 - July 2021)
- Discharged and Released from Judicial Custody
- "No prima facie materials to frame charges against the accused persons". - NIA Court, Guwahati, 01.07.2021

PC: Leaflet

BASHIR AHMED (KASHMIR)

- A Kashmiri who went to Gujarat for a 4-day camp on post-cancer care, arrested for allegedly being affiliated to Hizbul Mujahideen
- 11 years & 3 months in Jail (March 2010 - June 2021)
- Acquitted and Released from Judicial Custody
- "Prosecution relied on emotional argument and a person cannot be held guilty merely on its fear of anarchy". - NIA Court, Vadodara, 19.06.2021

PC: Indiatvnews

127 MUSLIMS (GUJARAT)



PC: Article-14



127 Muslims from across the country were arrested in Surat while attending a seminar on "educational rights", alleged as members of proscribed organisation SIMI



1 year of Jail before grant of bail



All 127 Acquitted after 19 years of trial (2001-2021)



"No cogent, reliable and satisfactory evidence is provided to suggest that the accused are the members of the unlawful organisation SIMI" - Surat CJM, 06.03.2021

Arrested for alleged connections with co-accused who is the head of sleeper cell, Indian Mujahideen



8 years in Jail (2014 - 2021)



Granted Bail and Released from Judicial Custody



"Above all, the long period of incarceration that the appellant has already undergone, time has arrived when he be enlarged on bail." - SC, 11.04.2022



JAHIR HAK (RAJASTHAN)



PC: The Indian Nation

HIDME MARKAM (CHHATTISGARH)



PC: Survival International



Tribal rights activist arrested from a protest site in Bastar for her alleged involvement in an armed attack that took place 5 years before her arrest



1 year & 4 months in Jail (March 2021 - Continuing)



In Judicial Custody

121 tribals Arrested in connection with 2017 ambush of CRPF team near Burkpal, for alleged links with Naxal wing



5 years & 3 months in Jail (April 2017 - July 2022)



All 121 tribals Acquitted and Released from Judicial Custody



"No charge is found to be substantiated in the offense charged against these accused." - NIA Court, Dantewada, 15.07.2022



121 TRIBALS (CHHATTISGARH)



PC: Hindustantimes

S.SINGAPANGA & 4 OTHERS (MUMBAI)



PC: Groundxero



Contract workers of Reliance Energy Ltd, Mumbai arrested on allegations of Maoist links



3 years & 3 months in Jail (Feb 2018 - May 2021)



Granted Bail and Released from Judicial Custody



"The material does not indicate any act which causes or intended to cause disaffection against India". - Bombay HC, 05.05.2021

Students' rights activist from Maharashtra arrested on charges of being a member of CPI (Maoist)



6 years & 4 months in Jail 2014 - Jan 2021 (died)



Died in Judicial Custody due to blood clot, her medical bail was rejected



PC: Indanexpress

KANCHAN NANAWARE (MAHARASHTRA)

ALAN & THAHA (KERALA)



PC: Mathrubhumi



Student Activists arrested for alleged links with Maoist



1 year & 7 months in Jail (Dec 2019 - July 2021)



Granted Bail and Released from Judicial Custody



"Membership to banned organization does not incriminate a person unless he resorts to violence" - SC, 28.10.2021

Auto-driver from Tripura arrested for his alleged role in 2005 IISC Bangalore shooting incident



4 years in Jail (2017 - 2021)



Discharged and Released from Judicial Custody



"I failed to understand why this accused was arraigned as an accused in the case". - NIA Court, Bangalore, 14.06.2021



MOHAMMAD HABEEB (BANGALORE)

PC: Live law

6. ANNEXURES

Annexure I – Lok Sabha Parliamentary Questions with Replies

S.No	Lok Sabha Unstarred Q. No	Date	URL
1.	2486	09.03.2021	http://164.100.24.220/loksabhaquestions/annex/175/AU2486.pdf
2.	2531	14.12.2021	http://164.100.24.220/loksabhaquestions/annex/177/AU2531.pdf

Annexure II - Sec.18 Cases of NIA database (238 cases)

RC-02/2016/NIA/DLI	RC-21/2019/NIA/DLI	RC-15/2015/NIA/DLI	RC-04/2019/NIA/HYD
RC-03/2016/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2019/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2019/NIA/MUM	RC-17/2017/NIA/DLI
RC-02/2018/NIA/HYD	RC-09/2021/NIA/DLI	RC-04/2015/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2017/NIA/DLI
RC-05/2016/NIA/DLI	RC-03/2011/NIA/DLI	RC-10/2013/NIA/DLI	RC-05/2016/NIA/KOC
RC-09/2016/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2012/NIA/HYD	RC-12/2013/NIA/DLI	RC-04/2012/NIA/DLI
RC-04/2016/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2020/NIA/KOC	RC-11/2013/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2019/NIA/KOC
RC-08/2016/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2010/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2016/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2016/NIA/HYD
RC-13/2015/NIA/DLI	RC-03/2014/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2014/NIA-DLI	RC-14/2015/NIA/DLI
RC-03/2016/NIA/HYD	RC-07/2019/NIA/DLI	RC-12/2016/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2020/NIA/JMU
RC-01/2015/NIA/HYD	RC-07/2013/NIA/DLI	RC-12/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-04/2020/NIA/JMU
RC-36/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-08/2013/NIA/DLI	RC-32/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-15/2017/NIA/DLI
RC-02/2010/NIA/DLI	RC-09/2013/NIA/DLI	RC-09/2011/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2021/NIA/JMU
RC-23/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-05/2019/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2017/NIA/LKW	RC-03/2013/NIA/DLI
RC-14/2017/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2009/NIA/DLI	RC-07/2009/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2019/NIA/GUW
RC-23/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2009/NIA/DLI	RC-08/2009/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2017/NIA/DLI
RC-04/2012/NIA/HYD	RC-01/2021/NIA/DLI	RC-05/2009/NIA/DLI	RC-19/2017/NIA/DLI
RC-01/2021/NIA/HYD	RC-01/2013/NIA/DLI	RC-06/2009/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2011/NIA/DLI
RC-02/2016/NIA/HYD	RC-11/2021/NIA/DLI	RC-09/2010/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2011/NIA/GUW
RC-39/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2014/NIA/HYD	RC-03/2017/NIA/LKW	RC-05/2013/NIA/DLI
RC-20/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-14/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-29/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-10/2010/NIA/DLI
RC-25/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2011/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2019/NIA/JMU	RC-24/2018/NIA/DLI
RC-08/2012/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2017/NIA/HYD	RC-08/2019/NIA/JMU	RC-01/2013/NIA/MUM
RC-26/2019/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2014/NIA/KOC	RC-07/2019/NIA/JMU	RC-10/2016/NIA/DLI
RC-05/2019/NIA/GUW	RC-01/2014/NIA/HYD	RC-04/2013/NIA/GUW	RC-11/2017/NIA/DLI
RC-04/2010/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2017/NIA/LKW	RC-05/2019/NIA/HYD	RC-12/2017/NIA/DLI
RC-02/2021/NIA/HYD	RC-01/2013/NIA/GUW	RC-26/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-17/2018/NIA/DLI
RC-18/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2011/NIA/HYD	RC-01/2011/NIA/GUW	RC-05/2020/NIA/DLI

RC-08/2019/NIA/GUW	RC-06/2020/NIA/JMU	RC-06/2012/NIA/DLI	RC-28/2018/NIA/DLI
RC-10/2015/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2019/NIA/KOC	RC-33/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-11/2011/NIA/DLI
RC-11/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-06/2015/NIA/DLI	RC-08/2019/NIA/DLI	RC-19/2019/NIA/DLI
RC-19/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-06/2016/NIA/DLI	RC-24/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-13/2019/NIA/GUW
RC-10/2017/NIA/DLI	RC-03/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-18/2019/NIA/DLI	RC-04/2019/NIA/JMU
RC-03/2018/NIA/LKW	RC-12/2015/NIA/DLI	RC-14/2019/NIA/DLI	RC-31/2021/NIA/DLI
RC-20/2021/NIA/DLI	RC-30/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-31/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-26/2021/NIA/DLI
RC-04/2011/NIA/DLI	RC-09/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-38/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-24/2021/NIA/DLI
RC-03/2021/NIA/JMU	RC-08/2011/NIA/DLI	RC-03/2017/NIA/DLI	RC-29/2021/NIA/DLI
RC-07/2011/NIA/DLI	RC-06/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-05/2021/NIA/DLI	RC-35/2021/NIA/DLI
RC-05/2019/NIA/JMU	RC-02/2018/NIA/MUM	RC-16/2019/NIA/DLI	RC-03/2021/NIA/HYD
RC-05/2020/NIA/JMU	RC-02/2015/NIA/HYD	RC-19/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2022/NIA/DLI
RC-02/2019/NIA/DLI	RC-08/2010/NIA/DLI	RC-08/2018/NIA/GUW	RC-02/2022/NIA/DLI
RC-40/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2020/NIA/MUM	RC-06/2010/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2022/NIA/JMU
RC-06/2011/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2013/NIA/GUW	RC-20/2017/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2022/NIA/JMU
RC-15/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-08/2015/NIA/DLI	RC-04/2012/NIA/GUW	RC-01/2022/NIA/GUW
RC-02/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-04/2017/NIA/LKW	RC-03/2020/NIA/JMU	RC-02/2022/NIA/GUW
RC-07/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2013/NIA/HYD	RC-01/2012/NIA/DLI	RC-10/2022/NIA/DLI
RC-02/2021/NIA/LKW	RC-03/2014/NIA/GUW	RC-13/2017/NIA/DLI	RC-19/2022/NIA/DLI
RC-04/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2013/NIA/HYD	RC-11/2016/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2022/NIA/HYD
RC-09/2017/NIA/DLI	RC-01/2014/NIA/MUM	RC-02/2020/NIA/GUW	RC-03/2022/NIA/JMU
RC-01/2015/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2021/NIA/GUW	RC-20/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2022/NIA/MUM
RC-04/2021/NIA/JMU	RC-04/2009/NIA/DLI	RC-37/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-04/2022/NIA/JMU
RC-03/2016/NIA/MUM	RC-09/2015/NIA/DLI	RC-05/2012/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2022/NIA/RNC
RC-04/2016/NIA/HYD	RC-13/2016/NIA/DLI	RC-12/2011/NIA/DLI	RC-03/2022/NIA/RNC
RC-05/2011/NIA/DLI	RC-05/2015/NIA/DLI	RC-06/2018/NIA/GUW	RC-18/2022/NIA/DLI
RC-14/2016/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2014/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2013/NIA/DLI	RC- 25/2022/NIA/DLI
RC-35/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-03/2015/NIA/DLI	RC-05/2010/NIA/DLI	RC-22/2022/NIA/DLI
RC-34/2020/NIA/DLI	RC-02/2021/NIA/JMU	RC-37/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-24/2022/NIA/DLI
RC-07/2010/NIA/DLI	RC-09/2019/NIA/DLI	RC-11/2015/NIA/DLI	RC-27/2022/NIA/DLI
RC-33/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-10/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-05/2013/NIA/KOC	RC-28/2022/NIA/DLI
RC-03/2019/NIA/JMU	RC-04/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-03/2013/NIA/HYD	
RC-01/2012/NIA/HYD	RC-16/2018/NIA/DLI	RC-06/2019/NIA/DLI	

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